Loyola of Los Angeles International
and Comparative Law Review
Volume 37

Number 2

Article 2

Spring 2015

The Dynamic Allocation of Burden Doctrine as a Mitigation of the
Undesirable Effects of Iqbal’s Pleading Standard
Nicolás J. Frías Ossandón

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/ilr
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons, and the International Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Nicolás J. Frías Ossandón, The Dynamic Allocation of Burden Doctrine as a Mitigation of the Undesirable
Effects of Iqbal’s Pleading Standard, 37 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 185 (2016).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/ilr/vol37/iss2/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola
Marymount University and Loyola Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles
International and Comparative Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.

FRIAS_FINAL_FOR_PUB (DO NOT DELETE)

2/24/2016 2:04 PM

The Dynamic Allocation of Burden Doctrine
as a Mitigation of the Undesirable Effects of
Iqbal’s Pleading Standard
1

NICOLÁS J. FRÍAS OSSANDÓN2
I. INTRODUCTION
The importance of the study and proper development of the procedural law doctrines is critical, as it “details the role of government,
through public courts, in settling disputes, creating new substantive
rules and policies, and implementing policies through law.”3
In the context of the civil procedural rules, the structure and standards of the early dismissal alternatives and the way in which the pretrial
stage of the judicial process is developed are strongly connected to the
way in which Governments ensure access to justice to the population.
According to Professors Clermont and Yeazell, the “early demise produces great social benefit if, in the end, the facts would not have supported a judgment for the plaintiff,”4 and a “considerable social harm if,
in the end, the facts would have supported such a judgment.”5
Since 2004 the Ministry of Justice of the Chilean Government has

1. This article was presented by the author in the Third Annual Conference of The Younger
Comparativists Committee of the American Society of Comparative Law, held in Portland, Oregon on April 4-5 2014 and hosted by the Lewis & Clark Law School.
2. Chilean attorney, General Coordinator of the Procedural Reforms Program of the School
of Law of the Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile. JD 2010, Pontificia Universidad Católica
de Chile. LL.M. 2014, UCLA School of Law. Before initiating his LL.M. studies, the author
worked for three years as a legal advisor at the Chilean Ministry of Justice, in the Division in
charge of the Civil Procedural Reform. The ideas presented in this paper represent the author’s
own views. I owe many thanks for helpful suggestions to Maureen Carroll, Greenberg Law Review Fellow at UCLA School of Law. E-mail address: njfrias@uc.cl
3. Mauro Cappelletti & Bryant G. Garth, Ch. 1: Intro. – Policies, Trends and Ideas in Civil
Procedure, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW: 16 Civil Procedure 3
(Mauro Cappelletti ed., (1987).
4. Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems,
95 IOWA L. REV. 821, 824 (2010).
5. Id.
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been committed to the development of a Civil Procedural Reform.6 The
Reform includes a New Civil Procedural Code (NCPC) currently under
discussion in the Chilean Congress, and different laws regarding related
topics such as the Alternative Dispute Resolution Mechanisms, judicial
fees, and court’s structure.7 When adopted, the NCPC will replace the
Code that has been in force since 1903, representing a paradigm shift in
terms of modernization of the judicial system and the due process component in judicial proceedings.8
One of the main features of the NCPC consists in the introduction
of the dynamic allocation of burdens doctrine.9 According to this principle, the court may, once the pleading phase has finished and the parties have offered their evidence, allocate the burden of proof between
the parties, on grounds of the availability and feasibility of the evidence.10 It is conceived as an extraordinary judicial power, with the
purpose of addressing a procedural inequality caused by the asymmetry
of information.
This would have a double positive effect. First, it would work as
an ex ante incentive to the required party’s commitment and cooperation to the process, strengthening the good faith principle as said party
would know the effects of non-cooperation. The second effect is that it
would contribute to reduce judicial error in the courts’ decisions, as this
tool improves the odds of delivering judgments more likely to reflect
the “material truth” of the dispute.
In this article, I examine the pleading standard of the United States
procedural system, analyzing from a critical perspective the changes
adopted by the Supreme Court in Twombly11 and Iqbal,12 where the Supreme Court incorporated the plausibility criterion of the pleading
standard. Then, I describe in a comparative way the Chilean Procedural
Reform and its decisions concerning the pleading standard, including a
description and analysis of the dynamic allocation of burden doctrine as
6. B. no. 8197-07 (Chile) (approved by the Chamber of Deputies, but under debate in the
Senate), available at
http://www.camara.cl/pley/pley_detalle.aspx?prmID=8596&prmBL=8197-07. However, the
Chamber of Deputies did not approve this doctrine, and was withdrawn from the Bill that passed
to the discussion at the Senate, stage that the Government may use to insist with this doctrine.
7. Id.
8. Cód. Civ. Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile/BCN [Chilean Library of Congress], available at http://www.leychile.cl/Navegar?idNorma=22740&idParte=0.
9. Proposal to Reform Civil Procedure System of Chile, Ministry of Justice of Chile,
http://rpc.minjusticia.gob.cl/media/2013/04/Informe-Procesal-Civil-Foro.pdf.
10. B. no. 8197-07, supra note 6.
11. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
12. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
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an alternative to mitigate the non-desirable effects of said pleading
standard.
Therefore this article proceeds as follows. Part One provides a description of the U.S. pleading standard and discusses the current debate
over the controversial decisions of the United States Supreme Court in
Twombly and Iqbal. Part Two describes the Chilean Civil Procedural
Process and highlights some features of its reform, with special analysis
of the dynamic allocation of burden doctrine. Finally, the final Part contains a study and proposal of the incorporation of that doctrine to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
II. MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER THE U.S. PROCEDURAL SYSTEM
A. Previous Rule: Description of the Pre-Iqbal Standard13
The main elements required to file a complaint in the United States
are stated in Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP).14
The critical requisite is specified in Rule 8(a)(2), which states that the
complaint has to contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”15
Before Twombly and Iqbal, the case that illustrated the application
of this rule was Conley v. Gibson.16 In Conley, the United States Supreme Court ruled that “a complaint should not be dismissed for failure
to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can
prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to
relief.”17 In other words, the plaintiff had to show to the court (i.e. it had
to appear to the court) that his or her case was not clearly (i.e. beyond
doubt) one in which he or she would not be able to prove any set of
supportive facts that would entitle him or her to further relief.
This standard is clearly exemplified by the same drafters of the
FRCP in its Form 11,18 which, as stated in Rule 84, “suffice[s] under
these rules [FRCP] and illustrate the simplicity and brevity that these
rules contemplate.”19 Said form is worthy to be reproduced entirely, as it
reflects what the words “short” and “plain” meant for the rule makers:
“(Caption—See Form 1.)
13. Id. As Iqbal confirmed and deepened Twombly’s pleading standard criteria, I will center
the analysis only on that last case.
14. FED. R. CIV. P. 8.
15. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
16. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
17. Id. at 45-46.
18. FED. R. CIV. P. Form 11.
19. FED. R. CIV. P. 84.
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1. (Statement of Jurisdiction—See Form 7.)
2. On [date], at [place], the defendant negligently drove a motor vehicle against the plaintiff.
3. As a result, the plaintiff was physically injured, lost wages
or income, suffered physical and mental pain, and incurred
medical expenses of $_______.
Therefore, the plaintiff demands judgment against the defendant for $_______, plus costs.
(Date and sign—See Form 2).”
This form contains only succinct and conclusory statements that
prevent arguing “over the formulation of the grievance, but makes starting a lawsuit unsupported by evidence very easy.”20 With that standard
one can criticize that it enables unscrupulous plaintiffs to easily meet
that pleading requirement and file ungrounded suits for intimidation
purposes that infringe upon the good faith principle and cause injury to
the defendant.
Consequently, the core question to be analyzed is: how can such a
broad pleading standard protect defendants from frivolous litigation?
The drafters of the FRCP addressed that concern not inside the requisites of the complaint itself but in the design of the procedural system as
a whole.21 “The motivating theory [of having this low pleading standard] was that the stages subsequent to [the] pleading [phase]–disclosure,
discovery, pretrial conferences, summary judgment, and [finally the]
trial–could more efficiently and fairly handle functions such as narrowing issues and revealing facts, and, thus, the whole system could better
deliver a proper decision on the merits.”22
Therefore, the purpose of this “broad” pleading stage was nothing
more than to “give fair notice of the pleader’s basic contentions to the
adversary,”23 without any judicial assessment of the facts or of the merit
of the allegations, and leaving to the remaining pretrial actions the task
of gathering and evaluating the evidence needed to sustain a trial.24
In fact, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide a judicial
tool, in the words of the United States Supreme Court, “against a party
20. Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 4, at 825.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 11; see Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing
Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 95 IOWA L. REV. 821, 824 (2010); see also Ramzi
Kassem, Implausible Realities: Iqbal’s Entrenchment of Majority Group Skepticism Towards
Discrimination Claims, 114 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1443, 1468-69 (2010).

FRIAS_FINAL_FOR_PUB (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

2/24/2016 2:04 PM

Burden Doctrine as a Mitigation of Effects of Iqbal

189

who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an
element essential to that party’s case:”25 summary judgment.
Thus, the judicial procedural system was designed to preempt superfluous or uncontroversial claims from reaching trial (with the summary judgment), but at the same time, as noted above, was elaborated to
assure everyone that his or her case would not be rejected if it states the
claim shortly and plainly and shows its entitlement to relief.26
From the public policy perspective that sustained this pleading
standard, two principles can be found in dispute: (i) the efficiency in the
use of the public resources; and (ii) the substantial or material justice as
the goal of the procedural system.27 Observing these criteria, the U.S.
procedural system, under the pre-Iqbal pleading standard, weighted justice over efficiency, leaving, mainly to the parties, the burden of the undesirable effects of ungrounded pretrial actions (i.e. the cost of the discovery proceeding).28
In addition, one can notice that it is an issue of proof availability:
all the acts, procedures and rules that govern the pretrial phase were designed to provide the facts that may, or may not, enable the plaintiff to
sustain a trial.29 As it is described below, in Twombly and Iqbal, the Supreme Court allocated this goal of the pretrial phase into the very first
stage of it, i.e. in the motion to dismiss; weighing the efficiency principle over justice, with all the potentially adverse effects to the judicial
system.30
B. Current Standard: Plausibility
1. Description of the Standard
Two recent cases from the Supreme Court of the United States
“have stirred the world of pleading civil litigation.”31 The first case was
25. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
26. Id.
27. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 329 (“. . .to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.”); Benjamin Spencer, Pleading and Access to Civil Justice: A Response to
Twiqbal Apologists, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1710, 1714, 1719, 1729 (2013) (Iqbal increases efficiency).
28. See Douglas Smith, The Evolution of a New Pleading Standard: Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 88
OR. L. REV. 1053, 1070-71 (2009).
29. Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 545; Robin J. Effron, The Plaintiff Neutrality Principle: Pleading Complex Litigation in the Era of Twombly and Iqbal, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1997, 2005
(2010); Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 95
IOWA L. REV. 821, 824 (2010); see Kassem supra note 24, at 1468-1470 (allowing limited discovery could uncover necessary facts).
30. Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 545; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
31. Robin J. Effron, supra note 29, at 51.
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Bell Atlantic Corp v. Twombly (2007)32 and the second was Ashcroft v.
Iqbal (2009).33
Twombly was a class action case between multiple Internet and telephone subscribers and a few large telecommunications companies,
where the plaintiffs claimed an illegal conspiracy in restraint of trade.34
The plaintiffs described the parallel conduct in detail and further alleged
the existence of an illegal agreement by defendant, but in conclusory
terms as they had no proof in hand.35 In this case, “the obvious concern. . .was that the claims opened the door to expensive discovery.”36
Consequently, “the Court upheld dismissal on a pre-answer motion,”37
because the plaintiff failed to meet the admissibility standard by not
showing the agreement amongst the competitors.38 According to the
Court in Twombly, asking for plausible grounds “calls for enough fact[s]
to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of
illegal agreement;”39 but in this case “nothing contained in the complaint invests either the action or inaction alleged with a plausible suggestion of conspiracy.”40
This case was controversial and, as noted above, represented a
deep modification to the pleading stage of judicial proceedings.41 It added the “plausibility” criterion to the pleading standard analysis and
raised the level needed for a claim to survive a motion to dismiss.42 In so
ruling, the Court instituted the need for a “judicial inquiry into the
pleading’s convincingness.”43 Two years later, said turn would be reaffirmed and strengthened by the Supreme Court, when issuing Iqbal.
In Iqbal, a Pakistani Muslim sued numerous important federal officials, including a former Attorney General of the United States, alleging that they “adopted an unconstitutional policy that subjected respondent to harsh conditions of confinement on account of [his] race,
religion or national origin.”44 Once the legal proceeding was initiated,
the defendants moved to dismiss “for failure to state sufficient allega32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 544.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)12.
See generally Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 544
Id. at 556.
Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 4, at 826.
Id.
Id.
Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 556.
Id. at 566.
Id. at 545.
Id. at 560; Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 4, at 829-30.
Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 4, at 827.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680.

FRIAS_FINAL_FOR_PUB (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

2/24/2016 2:04 PM

Burden Doctrine as a Mitigation of Effects of Iqbal

191

tions to show their own involvement in clearly established unconstitutional conduct.”45
Once the district court denied their motion, the defendants, invoking the collateral-order doctrine, filed an interlocutory appeal in the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.46 Said tribunal
considered Twombly’s applicability to this case, and concluded that
Twombly called for “a flexible ‘plausibility standard,’ which obliges a
pleader to amplify a claim with some factual allegations in those contexts where such amplification is needed to render the claim plausible.”47 The court considered that this case did not present one of those
contexts where amplification was needed, so it held plaintiff’s complaint “adequate to allege petitioners’ personal involvement in discriminatory decisions.”48 However, in his concurrence, Judge Cabranes urged
the Supreme Court of the United States to “address the appropriate
pleading standard ‘at the earliest opportunity,”49 and the Court granted
certiorari.
The Supreme Court, in an opinion delivered by Justice Kennedy,
reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and held that the plaintiff’s complaint “fails to plead sufficient facts to state a claim for purposeful and unlawful discrimination” against the defendants.50 Contrary
to Conley, which set forth the no-set-of-facts criteria to grant a motion
to dismiss, in Iqbal even though “the plausibility standard is not akin to
a ‘probability requirement’ . . . it asks for more than a sheer possibility
that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”51
In Iqbal the Court reaffirmed and explained the shift of Twombly.
In words of Justice Kennedy:
“Two working principles underlie our decision in Twombly.
First, the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice. . .
Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the hypertechnical, code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not
unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions. Second, only a complaint that
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. at 669.
Id.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 662.
Id. at 670.
Id.
Id. at 687.
Id. at 678.
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states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss . . . Determining whether a complaint states a plausible
claim for relief will, as the Court of Appeals observed, be a
context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw
on its judicial experience and common sense. . . But where the
well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than
the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not “show[n]”—”that the pleader is entitled
to relief.” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(a)(2).”52 [Emphasis added]
In other terms, there is a line from ‘conceivability’ (Conley) to
‘plausibility’ (Twombly and Iqbal) that the plaintiff must pass in order
to survive a motion to dismiss.53 Now, if a plaintiff wants his or her
case to enter into the disclosure and discovery phases, he or she has to
make plausible the existence of certain material facts that can sustain a
judgment in his or her favor.54
2. Iqbal Scholars’ Analysis
The impact of these cases in the judicial community was and still
is of critical significance. Since its issuance by the Supreme Court in
2009, Iqbal has been cited in 71,190 cases, in 65,015 trial courts documents and in 9,457 appellate court documents.55 In order to weigh those
numbers, we have to compare them with other relevant cases, such as
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993)56 regarding the
admission of expert evidence, which was cited in 16,257 cases and in
60,635 trial court documents;57 or Roe v. Wade (1973)58 worldwide case
regarding abortion and women rights, which has been cited in 3,828
cases, 1,143 trial court documents and in 3,832 appellate court documents.59
However, Iqbal caused a great impact not only to the judicial practice but to the academic analysis as well: 1,135 references in Law Reviews and 1,456 in other secondary sources only in 3 years.60 Below is
provided a brief description of the main arguments stated by the supporters and detractors of this new pleading standard.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. at 678-79 (emphasis added).
Kassem, supra note 24, at 1449.
Id. at 1444.
According to KeyCite, West Law (February 25, 2014).
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms. Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
According to KeyCite, West Law (February 25, 2014).
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
According to KeyCite, West Law (February 25, 2014).
According to KeyCite, West Law (February 25, 2014).
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a. Iqbal’s supporters
There are three main categories of the defenses to Iqbal’s pleading
standard:61 (i) those who believe that the decision is consistent with the
intent of the Advisory Committee and with the inherent doctrine of the
Rule; (ii) those who assure that it has not had any impact on the rate at
which the grant of motion to dismiss has terminated cases; and (iii)
those who esteem that it was a good shift in the pleading standard in
terms of the efficiency of the system and good faith criteria.62
The first group of supporters believes that with this decision the
Supreme Court did nothing but accept a long practice traditionally recognized by the courts regarding the legal conclusions in a claim.63 For
this position, the “plausibility standard of Twombly can be understood
as equivalent to the traditional insistence that a factual inference be reasonable.”64 In other words, for the supporters of this interpretation, the
requisites of the Rule 8(a)(2) have always implied a “plausibility” revision. This group also contains those scholars who believe that this was
only a nominal change of the same pleading standard, and those who
state that this recent decision did reaffirm the original sense of the Rule
8(a)(2).65
The second set of defendants of Iqbal sustains that “the effects of
the revision to pleading standards ushered in Twombly and Iqbal have
been negligible, meaning that concern over the change is much ado
about little or nothing.”66 The supporters of this position provide two
main reasons.67 First, because the Court’s decision does not represent a
change but an alignment with preexisting lower court’s pleading approaches, the impact will be minimal.68 The second reason provided is
that there are studies that show that there is no impact at all regarding
the rate at which a grant of a motion to dismiss has terminated cases.69
Therefore, as Iqbal and Twombly’s pleading standard does not represent
any change to the current procedural law, there is not a new challenge or
61. Benjamin Spencer, Pleading and Access to Civil Justice: A Response to Twiqbal Apologists, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1710, 1713 (2013).
62. Id. at 1713-14.
63. Id. at 1713
64. Edward A. Hartnett, Taming Twombly, Even After Iqbal, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 473, 474
(2010).
65. Spencer, supra note 61, at 1715-1720.
66. Id. at 1720.
67. Id. at 1721, 1725.
68. Id.
69. JOE S. CECIL, GEORGE W. CORT, MARGARET S. WILLIAMS & JARED J. BATAILLON,
FED. JUDICIAL CTR., REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL
RULES, MOTIONS TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM AFTER IQBAL (2011).
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concern regarding the guarantees of the judicial system.
The third group of supporters sustains the efficiency defense.70 The
members of this group “not only recognize the change –they laud it.”71
The main issue here is the concern about the abuse of discovery that a
lower standard may cause, with all the associated costs to the defendants.72 They argue that this change represents a good orientation and decreases the risks associated to expensive discoveries.73 Furthermore,
they state that a low standard empowers frivolous litigation and promotes extortionate settlements.74As affirmed by Professor Bone, this argument basically states that “as the costs of litigation increase and the
scope of discovery expands, the need for more stringent pleading standards increases.”75
Therefore, according to this position, neither the efficiency nor the
fairness criterion is achieved in a system that allows claims with dubious merits to proceed, as it opens the gate to settlements not grounded
on the merits of the dispute, but in the prospective costs of the defendant to continuing in that litigation.76 In other terms, this perspective
states that plaintiffs cannot access discovery “until they can pay the new
price of admission –a demonstration of factual support sufficient to render their claims plausible.”77
b. Iqbal’s detractors
It is not hard to infer that under Iqbal’s criteria, a case that passes a
motion to dismiss needs to be stronger than before.78 If we understand
the main words of Rule 8(a) (short, plain and show) in their common
use and sense in light of the Conley interpretation of the Rule, then it is
hard to assume in advance the plausibility requirement that came after
Iqbal. Thus, the plausibility criterion of review is a new one and was affirmed by the Supreme Court in the cases under analysis.79
Consequently, the question that needed to be answered when increasing the standard is: how can a judicial system achieve its main

70. Spencer, supra note 61, at 1713-14, 1728.
71. , Id. at 1728.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Robert P. Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, and the Regulation of Court Access, 94 IOWA
L. REV. 873 (2009).
75. Smith, supra note 28, at 1055..
76. Id.
77. Spencer, supra note 61, at 1729.
78. Id. at 1732.
79. Id. at 1716.
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purpose, which is to impart justice to people? When analyzing this issue, one has to take into account that for the plaintiff, “offering such
facts [required in a complaint post-Iqbal] before discovery begins seems
particularly problematic for claimants alleging concealed wrongdoing.”80
But even without considering the strong question as to the discovery cost argument that makes more evident the inadequacy of this higher standard,81 the system of justice has to be designed to achieve its
main goal, which is, again, to deliver justice to everyone who requires
it.
Therefore, in Iqbal the core goal of the judicial system is not traduced as the main principle of the system and their limitations as exceptions. By the contrary, with the plausibility standard, it seems that the
rule is to preempt access to the system of justice and the exception is to
survive a motion to dismiss.82 Conley contains an important public policy view stating that the general rule of a complaint is not to be dismissed “unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no
set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”83
(Emphasis added.) It is a strong pro access to justice rule that has a direct impact on society. It is important to take into account that “[h]ow
much law regulates social behavior depends in large part on how the
machinery of justice is constructed.”84
In addition, the subjectivity of the plausibility standard is quite evident. According to Professor Kassem, “Iqbal seems to have transformed judicial gut instinct into a gate-keeping mechanism.”85 As there
is not enough clarity about what plausibility means, each judge will
ground his or her dismissal or non-dismissal decisions with different
criteria.86 That scenario entails a direct impact on the basic citizens’
guarantees from the equal protection clause perspective and also from
the economic perspective, as judicial uncertainty is not an incentive to
preempt litigation but to encourage it.87
As the law professor and circuit judge Richard Posner has stated,

80. Benjamin Spencer, Iqbal and the Slide Toward Restrictive Procedure, 14 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 185, 188 (2010) [hereinafter Iqbal and the Slide Toward Restrictive Procedure].
81. Spencer, supra note 61, at 1729-33.
82. Id. at 1731-32.
83. Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46.
84. Cappelletti & Garth, supra note 3, at 1-2.
85. See Kassem, supra note 24, at 1446.
86. Id. at 1447; see Kang & Bennett et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L.
Rev., 1124, 1160 (2012).
87. Kassem, supra note 24, at 1481; Spencer, supra note 61, at 1724.
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“The [Supreme] Court said in Iqbal that the ‘plausibility standard is not
akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”88 He goes on and expressly criticizes the ambiguity of the plausibility standard. Judge Posner states that “[t]his is a little unclear because plausibility, probability,
and possibility overlap. . . The fact that the allegations undergirding a
claim could be true is no longer enough to save a complaint from being
dismissed; the complaint must establish a nonnegligible probability
that the claim is valid.”89 (Emphasis added.)
Finally, I believe that this new standard, especially considering its
ambiguity as stated above, implies some other due process concerns
from the defendants’ position as well. If a court in a civil case -where
the common standard of proof is preponderance of the evidence90- decides, even without any discovery or disclosure proceeding, that the
claimant’s allegations are “plausible,” how likely is it to change its
opinion in the final judgment?
Moreover, if the court has found “plausible” certain allegations,
how neutral is its interpretation of the evidence? Is it going to approach
the evidence trying to confirm its previous decision or trying to decide
in a completely independent way? As the proof standard in these cases
is related to the likelihood of certain sets of facts instead of others, one
can infer that the early “plausibility” decision of the court may turn
practically into a final pronouncement over the likeliness of the evidence in the case, and therefore, into a strong “persuasion” of the direction of the final judgment. Among other effects, that situation can produce an important harm to the negotiation power of the defendant and it
could strengthen disproportionately the plaintiff’s bargaining power.
Professors Kang, Carbado, Casey, Dasgupta, Faigman, Godsil,
Greenwald, Levinson and Mnookin, and Judge Bennett have analyzed
the implicit bias in the Courtroom in multidisciplinary research.91 When
analyzing the effects of Iqbal and Twombly, they assert that in cases
where we “lack sufficient individuating information -which is largely
the state of affairs at the motion to dismiss stage- we have no choice but
to rely more heavily on our schemas.”92 Then, they raise the applicability of the social judgeability theory to this case, which states that “there

88. In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litig., 630 F.3d 622, 629 (7th Cir. Ill. 2010).
89. Id. (emphasis added).
90. 42 C.F.R. § 93.219 (2005) (i.e. proof by information that, compared with that opposing
it, leads to the conclusion that the fact at issue is more probably true than not).
91. See generally Kang et al., supra note 86, at 1124.
92. Id. at 1160.
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are social rules that tell us when it is appropriate to judge someone.”93
According to the authors, since Iqbal made dismissals easier, we should
see a growth in dismissal rates and with more inference of implicit or
explicit bias.94
Now that I have described from a historical and critical perspective
the U.S. pleading standard, in the next section, I will explain how it
works in the projected Chilean civil procedure. There I will describe
and explain how the dynamic allocation of burdens doctrine could be an
interesting solution to some cases where the manifest asymmetry of information between the parties makes it impossible for the plaintiff to
meet the plausibility standard.
III. CHILE’S PLEADING STANDARD UNDER THE NEW CIVIL PROCEDURAL
CODE (“NCPC”)
Since 2004, the Government of Chile has been designing a new set
of codes, statutes, and institutions aimed at improving the standards of
civil justice.95 It constitutes a paradigm shift in the way in which civil
and commercial cases are going to be developed and in terms of modernization of the judicial service as a whole.
A. Summary of the Current Chilean Civil Procedural System
The Chilean civil procedure has three main phases: the discussion
phase; the evidence phase; and the judgment phase.96 The discussion
phase is initiated with the filing of the lawsuit or by the request of a
prejudicial injunction.97 Once the plaintiff has properly submitted the
suit, he – at his own expense and through judicial official – has to notify
the defendant, who then has 15, 18 or a maximum of 30 days (depending on his location) to oppose pre-answer motions or to respond to and
sue the plaintiff on the same factual grounds (cross-claim). The preanswer motions are procedural, (e.g. lack of court’s jurisdiction, pending process, lack of formalities in the complaint98) and substantive (i.e.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1163 (“[T]he more gap filling and inferential thinking that a judge has to engage
in, the more room there may be for explicit and implicit biases to structure the judge’s assessment
in the absence of a well-developed evidentiary record.”).
95. See generally Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile [Chilean National Library of
Congress], Código de Procedimiento Civil [Civil Procedure Code] (2014), available at
http://www.leychile.cl/Navegar?idNorma=22740&idParte=0 [hereinafter Chilean Library of
Congress].
96. See Cód. Civ., supra note 8, at art. 253.
97. Chilean Library of Congress, supra note 95.
98. See Cód. Civ., supra note 8, at art. 303.
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res judicata, transaction, prescription and payment99). If the court esteems that this last group of motions needed to be resolved after a
sounding procedure, it may order the defendant to respond and would
reserve the decision over these motions to the judgment of the case.
Once the court’s decision over the pre-answer motion has been made
and the case has survived, the defendant has ten days to respond.100
Six days after the submission of the response by the defendant, the
plaintiff has to reply.101 Then, the defendant responds to the plaintiff’s
reply, and the court calls the parties to a Conciliation Conference and
promotes the basis of a judicial agreement.102 This conference has not
shown good results in finishing cases through settlement.103
The second phase is the evidence term, which starts with a court
resolution that indicates the controversial facts that need to be proven
and which evidence is required.104 This term is also developed in writing65F that thoroughly regulates each type of evidence that can be provided and the way in which the judge must evaluate it.105 Each piece of
evidence is presented to the court in writing and there are judicial conferences for the production of certain proof (i.e. witnesses’ declaration
and electronic documents).106
Finally, the procedure finishes with the judgment stage.107 Once the
evidence term is completed, which regularly has to be within twenty
days after the opening of the evidence term plus ten days of parties’ observation, no further evidence is accepted except those ordered by the
judge, and the court has to dictate a resolution that “calls the parties to

99. See id. art. 304.
100. Id. art. 408; Chilean Library of Congress, supra note 95, at art. 308.
101. Cód. Civ., supra note 8, at art. 698.
102. Id.
103. Ministerio de Justicia, Informe Final: Panel de Expertos Modelo Organico para la incorporacion de Sistemas Alternativos de Resolucion de Conflictos [Final Report: Panel of Experts
for the Incorporation of Alternative Dispute Resolution Systems], (2013), available at
http://rpc.minjusticia.gob.cl/media/2013/07/Informe-Final-SARC.pdf (Chile) (The Conciliation
Conference was adopted in an Amendment to the CPC made through the passing of Law No
19.334 on October 7, 1994. Its purpose was to promote the achieved settlements and to reduce the
courts’ workload. However, according to data from the Ministry of Justice, in 2010 out of
1,656,003 civil cases, only 1,127 were completed by this Conciliation Conference).
104. Cód. Civ., supra note 8, at art. 318.
105. The evidence is presented and produced in writing, with exception to the witnesses’ declaration that is held in a conference in the tribunal. Also, there is a specific audience to debate
over the veracity of electronic documents (Article 348 bis of the Cód. Proc. Civ.). It is in writing
in terms of the communication between the judge and the parties and as a general rule of presenting and producing evidence.
106. See Cód. Civ., supra note 8, at art. 348.
107. Id. art. 158
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hear judgment.”108 From the date of that resolution, the court has to issue the final judgment within sixty days.109
From a comparative perspective, the current Chilean civil procedural system has all the features attributed to the procedural civil law
tradition.110 First, it endorsed total predominance to the written component.111 In the Chilean Civil Procedure the principle “quod non est in
actis non est in mundo, (procedural acts not reduced to writing are null
and void)” is entirely applicable as the tribunal is mandated to base its
decision exclusively upon the written record.112 Second, it is characterized by the so-called formal or legal system of proof: the assessment of
evidence is accurately established in the law under almost mathematical
rules.113 Finally, it tends to discourage any direct contact between the
tribunal and the parties, the witnesses or any other source of information.114 The system is not designed to facilitate encounters of the parties with the judge, instead court officials almost always receive the
witness’ declaration, party confession and, in general, the evidence.115
B. Highlights of a Major Procedural Reform and Commonality
with the U.S. Procedural System
The procedure briefly described above is stated in book two of the
Chilean Civil Procedure Code.116 The CPC was approved in 1903 -its
drafting began in the 1890’s- in the context of the necessities of a rather
nascent society, with a commercial and legal situation much different
from that of today.117 As stated before, it is mainly in writing, contemplates rigid and time-consuming procedures, was designed under past
procedural principles (e.g. the evidence stage is developed in writing,
only certain evidence is accepted and its valuation is according to a
plain measure stated in the CPC) and it is deployed under insufficient
108. Id. arts. 328, 572, 688.
109. Id. art. 162.
110. See Cappelletti & Garth, supra note 3, at 5.
111. Id.
112. Id. A translation could be “the elements that are not in the judicial record, are not in the
world [of the judge],” which means that the Tribunal, when deciding the dispute, must consider
exclusively the written record as stated in the judicial file of the case.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Ministerio de Justicia, Informe Final: Estudio de Analisis de Trayectoria de las Causas
civiles en los tribunales civiles de Santiago [Analytical Study of the Track record of civil causes
in
the
civil
courts
of
Santiago],
(May
2011),
available
at
http://rpc.minjusticia.gob.cl/media/2013/04/Estudio-Trayectorias-Causas-Civiles-en-TribunalesCiviles-Santiago.pdf (Chile).
117. See generally B. no. 8197-07, supra note 6, at 3.
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judicial technology and infrastructure.118
Even though one can notice that the timing of the judicial acts stated in the CPC is reasonable, according to a study conducted by the
Chilean Ministry of Justice, on average, a civil claim in the courts of
Santiago lasts 803 days from the file of the suit to the judgment of the
inferior court.119 However, if the duration of the appeal process is considered (that stays the execution of the judgment of the inferior court)
the average final number of days exceeds 1500.120
Therefore, since 2004 the Ministry of Justice of the Chilean Justice
is dedicated to the design of a major Reform to the Civil Procedural
System. Its keystones are the following:121
(i)
A new Civil Procedural Code that brings an updated procedure developed mainly through hearings before a judge
with improved case management powers, including the
corresponding use of technologies in notifications, liberty
in the presentation of evidence and grounded validation of
them directly by the judge;
(ii)
An Alternative Dispute Resolution Network, which facilitates the practice of professional mediation and arbitration
in commercial and civil disputes;122
(iii)
The subtraction of the enforcement of the judgments and
other executive titles from the Judicature, settling it into
independent sheriffs called “execution officials;”123 and finally
(iv)
The strengthening of the role of the Supreme Court as a
warrant of the constitutionality of the judicial decisions of
all other national courts, giving it discretion in the selection of cases and promoting its role as unifier of jurisprudence.
All these changes require a profound reform to the organic structure of the judicial power, which would mainly translate into an adequate instruction of judges and the required education of all the legal

118. Cód. Civ., supra note 8 at 43.
119. Estudio de Analisis de Trayectoria de las Causas civiles en los tribunales civiles de Santiago, supra note 117, at 106.
120. Id. at 9. In addition, said study states that there is an excessive extension of time between the communication of the claim to the defendant and the end of the discussion phase (237
days); and of the evidence term (315 days).
121. B. no. 8197-07, supra note 6, at 3.
122. B. no. 8197-07, supra note 6.
123. Ministerio de Justicia, Informe Final, supra note 103 (It is a model inspired in the “Hussier de Justice” of France.).
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community.
The NCPC establishes a common civil procedure with a simple
and clear structure. The process starts with a written pretrial or discussion phase, comprehended mainly by the suit and its response and/or its
pre-answer motions. Afterwards, there is a preliminary conference,
where the court prepares the trial by, among other things, addressing the
pre-answer motions, defining the scope of the dispute and the evidence
that is going to be rendered in trial and by proposing a basis for settlement. Then comes the trial, where the evidence is rendered and crossexamined to a public audience in front of the judge. Finally there is the
judgment phase, where the judge has a limited time of 10 days (that can
be increased in a few exceptions) to issue the judgment, subject to an
ipso iure nullity of the trial and disciplinary sanctions.
As one can observe, this new process presents similarities to the
U.S. procedural system, regarding the structure of the process and the
role of the judge in the valuation of the evidence. The two processes are
mainly developed through hearings in front of the judge, where the parties are free to introduce any evidence that may sustain their case, and it
has to be analyzed and valuated by the judge in an oral trial that assures
a proper cross-examination by the parties, under his own presence
(something that is not guaranteed in the current Chilean system). All of
those elements from an American legal tradition are essential features of
civil litigation and are totally new to the Chilean civil system of Justice.124
Additionally, the NCPC contemplates the power to the Supreme
Court to select the cases that it wants to hear; as long as it esteems that
those cases are of general interest on two broad grounds stated in the
former Article 409.125 This power to select the cases and its role as unifier of jurisprudence, that is part of the essentials of the U.S. Legal System, was totally new to the Chilean system.126

124. Even though, those principles are not new to the Chilean Judicial System as a whole, as
in the year 2000 the new Criminal Procedural Code was implemented, then in 2004 the new Family Justice system was deployed and finally in 2008 the same was done to the new Labor Justice
System. All of those reforms introduced the modern procedural principles stated above and contributed to modernize the judicial system. Additionally, there is another similarity with the U.S.
system in relation to the new role of the Supreme Court.
125. B. no. 8197-07, supra note 6, at 150.
126. However, in the final discussion at the Chamber of Deputies (May 2014), the representatives chose to reject that provision from the NCPC. The Ministry of Justice is currently studying
its reincorporation at the Senate’s discussion.
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C. Pretrial Phase Under the NCPC
Article 253 of the NCPC states the requirements of the pleading.127
Number 4 requires “the exposition of each point of fact that sustains the
requests of the lawsuit, a direct indication of the evidence that will be
used to prove the groundings of the case and of the laws that sustain the
case.”128 In addition, when filing a complaint, the plaintiff must attach
all the documents that he or she is about to use on trial as evidence and
offer to join expert reports, witnesses statements and any other evidence.129
The Message of the NCPC states the reason of these requirements.130 It argues that the Executive is convinced of the “need to require [in plaintiffs] seriousness and real grounds when deciding to file a
judicial complaint, therefore the Bill demands . . . that the actor, along
with the attachment of all the documentary evidence available and with
the list of all the witnesses and experts that he will use on trial, must declare the rest of the evidence that he would use to prove, and request its
completion.”131 Therefore, the principle here is to void frivolous litigation of ungrounded or disproportionable requests and irresponsible
complaints filed only for settlement purposes.
Nonetheless, this claimant’s requirement of submitting all the evidence with the lawsuit has three important mitigations. First, in contrast
to Iqbal where the Court has to review the requisites of the complaint on
a subjective basis, here not “plausibility” or pre evaluation on the merits
is applicable.132 The court’s evaluation is objective. The issue here is
that, as a general rule, the plaintiff only can use the evidence provided,
requested or stated in his or her suit.133
However, and here is the second nuance, if a party does not have
any document that he or she needs for Article 253 paragraph 4 purposes,
the NCPC allows the party to require the Court to order the incorporation of the required documents to the file of the case.134 Also, the parties
can request the practice of several evidentiary diligences; and even the
court can request itself the practice and incorporation of evidence into
127. B. no. 8197-07, supra note 6, at 104.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 104-105
130. See generally id. at 1-42.
131. Id. at 33-34.
132. Id. at 53; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).
133. See B. no. 8197-07, supra note 6, at 104. With the few exceptions stated in the NCPC.
E.g. evidence regarding new facts dated after the file of the suit or proven to be unknown by the
party that wants to introduce it (Article 276 NCPC).
134. Id. at 104.
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the process.135 The focus of the NCPC is not in who introduces the evidence but with which guarantees that evidence is incorporated into the
process (i.e. allowing a proper cross-examination and a public hearing
in front of the judge).
Finally, as the third nuance to consider, one can find the dynamic
allocation of burdens doctrine, which I will briefly develop below.
D. Dynamic Allocation of Burdens Doctrine
1. Description of the Doctrine136
One of the most interesting – and controversial – features of the
NCPC is the incorporation of the dynamic allocation of burdens doctrine. The second paragraph of the Article 296 of the NCPC states as
follows:
“The Court may allocate the burden of proof in accordance to the
availability and feasibility of the evidence of each party, a decision that
the Court shall notify to the parties with due anticipation [in the preliminary audience], in light of the consequences that the Court decision
may have for the parties’ obligation to present evidence.”137
135. Id. at 77-78.
136. At a comparative doctrine level, many different authors have contributed to the development of this doctrine. Some significant authors and their relevant works are: Leo Rosemberg,
La carga de la prueba, Ediciones Jurídicas Europa América, Third Edition, (1956); Alvaro Luna
Yerga, Regulación de la carga de la prueba en la LEC. En particular, la prueba de la culpa en
los procesos de responsabilidad civil médico-sanitaria, InDret (2003); Osvaldo Gozani, La presunción de inocencia. Del proceso penal al proceso civil, Revista Latinoamericana de Derecho,
III Year, No. 6, 155-179 (July - December 2006); Raquel Castillejo Manzanares, La carga de la
prueba en el proceso civil por responsabilidad médica, Diario La Ley, No. 6563, XXVII Year
(October 4, 2006); Jorge W. Peyrano & Inés Lépori White, Cargas Probatorias Dinámicas, (Rubinzal Culzoni ed., Buenos Aires, 2008); Julio Pérez Gil, Probar la discriminación. Una mirada
a las normas sobre la carga de la prueba en la ley de igualdad, in Oralidad y Escritura en un
Proceso Civil Eficiente, Carpi & Ortells Ramos Ed., t. II, Universitàt de València, 211-224
(2008); Michele Taruffo, La prueba, (Marcial Pons ed., 2008). Rolf Stürner, La obtención de información probatoria en el proceso civil, Revista de Derecho de la Pontificia Universidad Católica de Valparaíso XXX, 1º Semestre, 243 – 262 (2008); Diego Palomo Véliz, Los deberes de aviso
e información del juez y de esclarecimiento y colaboración de las partes, in Reforma procesal
civil, oralidad y poderes del juez (Legal Publishing ed., Colección Derecho y Proceso, 369-380,
2010); Hanns Prütting, Carga de la prueba y estándar probatorio: La Influencia de Leo Rosenberg y Karl Hainz Schwab para el desarrollo del moderno Derecho probatorio, 1 Ius et Praxis,
16 Year, 453 – 464 (2010); Guilermo Ormazábal Sánchez, Discriminación y Carga de la Prueba
en el Proceso Civil (Marcial Pons ed., Madrid, 2011); Juan Montero Aroca, Derecho jurisdiccional II. Proceso civil, (Tirant lo Blanch ed., Valencia, 2009); Juan Montero Aroca, La prueba en el
proceso civil (Editorial Civitas ed., Pamplona, 2011).
137. B. no. 8197-07, supra note 6, at 116 (“El tribunal podra distribuir de la prueba conforme
a la disponibilidad y facilidad probatoria que posea cada una de las partes en el litigio lo que comunicará a ellas, con la debida antelación, para que asuman las consecuencias que les pueda generar la ausencia o insuficiencia de material probatorio que hayan debido aportar o no rendir la
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It is conceived as an extraordinary power, needed in cases of
asymmetry of information between the parties that can affect the equality principle.138 It has to be understood in a judicial system designed to
obtain the substantial truth of the case, which seeks a total application of
the cooperation and good faith principles.139 In that context and as stated above, it is not important who brings the evidence to the Court, but
the way in which it is rendered (i.e. with cross-examination and in a
public audience in front of the judge) and weighed by the court (i.e. according to the “sound criticism” or “reasoned judgment” of the court
contrary to a fixed legal standard of proof).140
The ‘dynamic’ part of the name was adopted with the finality to
oppose it to a static or fixed idea of valuation of the evidence and to
show its ability to adapt to discrete cases.141 Therefore, the dynamic allocation of burdens doctrine relies on the principle that the distributive
rule of the burden of proof does not respond to inflexible principles: it
must be adapted to each case, according to the nature of the alleged or
denied facts and to the availability and feasibility to prove.142
An example is useful to illustrate this doctrine. A patient was injured in a medical procedure of a large hospital and wants to sue to recover damages for medical malpractice. All the video records of the operation, the names of the specialists that took part in the process and
different details of the injury are known and stored only by the hospital.
prueba correspondiente de que dispongan en su poder.”). As noted above in supra note 9, this
provision was withdrawn from the Bill by the Camber of Deputies, waiting for its inclusion by
the Senate in the current discussion.
138. B. no. 8197-07, supra note 6, at 18 (The purpose of this doctrine is to correct eventual
inequalities between the parties.).
139. Id. at 17, 44 (Article 13 of the NCPC states that the judge when applying the procedural
rules “has to take into account that the purpose of the rules is the effectiveness of the rights stated
in the substantive law, and that in the expeditious treatment of the judicial procedures and in the
just resolution of the conflicts subject to its jurisdiction, the public interest is committed.” In addition, the Message of the NCPC (§IV.1) states “the parties have to have access to the civil procedure in equality conditions, with the right to obtain a resolution over the grounds of the dispute, if
not settled by other dispute resolution mechanism. A judgment that does not resolve the merits of
the dispute because of procedural issues is a failure of the justice [system]”.).
140. Those rules of valuating the evidence differ from the actual rules of the CPC, where the
judge has to apply a legal valuation to each type of evidence according to and objective criteria
stated by law. For example, Article 384 of the CPC expressly rules how judges have to valuate
different situations that can be presented in a witness’ declaration.
141. See Omar Luis Diaz Solime, La Dinámica en la Carga Probatoria y la Conducta Procesal de las Partes [The Dynamic in the Burden of Proof and the Procedural Conduct of the Parties], in Revista de Derecho Procesal 347, 374 (2009) (Editoriales de Derecho Reunidas ed., Madrid).
142. Maria de los Angeles Gonzalez, La Carga Dinámica de la Prueba [The Dynamic Allocation of the Proof], 22 REVISTA DE DERECHO PROCESAL [REV. DER. PROCESA] 263, 370 (2012).
(The author has translated part of this source from Spanish to English for purposes of this article.)
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According to the basic principle of the burden of proof, the patient that
is seeking application of the rule has to prove that the injurer must pay
damages to the injured and must provide sufficient evidence of facts
that occurred. For a judicial action to succeed against the injurer, the patient must prove the negligence and capacity of the injurer, the existence
of an injury, and the causal relationship between the action of the injurer
and the injury suffered. If the hospital refuses to cooperate with the
process and opt to pay the fine or other sanction for not cooperating,
then how can the patient provide all of these records owned by the hospital? Or, from the court’s perspective, how can it issue a judgment other than dismissing the case if no relevant evidence is provided?
According to the dynamic allocation of burdens doctrine, in this
case, given that the hospital is the owner of the relevant evidence and
because the evidence is available, the court could release the plaintiff
from his obligation to prove and require instead the hospital to prove
that it acted according to the law.143 It represents a high level of difficulty to an ordinary patient to prove that the scientific or medical proceedings were conducted improperly.
However, this burden to prove a new fact does not mean that the
other party (i.e. the plaintiff) is free from proving. Consequently, the
party “who pretends the displacement of the burden of proof (. . .) has to
have proved, even indirectly, that the other party is, or was, in better
conditions to prove.”144
2. Application of the Doctrine in Other Latitudes
This doctrine is not new at a comparative level, and it has had an
interesting development, mainly in Latin-American countries.145 We
find similar regulation in different European countries and international
conventions as well.146 I believe that having a worldwide perspective of
this theory contributes to a proper comprehension of the doctrine.
The Supreme Court of Colombia has adopted this doctrine in different cases.147 In a decision issued on November 3, 1977, in a medical
malpractice case, the Supreme Court of Colombia ruled that “if the patient dies (. . .) and its heirs submit that the medical professional had
143. LEY DE ENJUICIAMIENTO CIVIL (L.E. CIV.) (CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE) art. 217.7
(Spain).
144. See Gonzalez, supra note 142, at 380.
145. See id.
146. Cappelletti & Garth, supra note 3, at 62-63.
147. Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], Sala. Civ. enero 30, 2001, M.P: J.
Gomez, Expediente CCLXX-2509, Gaceta Judicial [G.J.] (No. 5507) (Colom.) [hereinafter
CCLLXX-2509].
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suspended or reduced the treatment, its the medic who has the burden to
prove whether he did perform properly, whether he was legally excused
to perform or whether if the practitioner would have performed the patient would have died anyway.”148 In another medical malpractice case
the Court maintained its rule and argued that precisely in this sector of
behavior that is connected to the required performance [in a medical
malpractice case], it is not possible to establish absolute rules of burden
to prove with no attendance to the discrete case.149
In addition, the Colombian Constitutional Court has adopted this
institution mainly to cases of human rights violations and forced displacement.150 In a decision drafted by Justice Triviño on January 16,
2009, ID T-006/09, the Constitutional Court ruled that the specific circumstances of the claimant, conduces to the reversal of the burden of
proof, being a duty to the Government to prove that the assertions made
by the claimant are not true and, therefore, there is not a situation of
displacement.151 The claimant was an extremely low-income citizen of
María la Baja, Bolivar Department, Colombia; who claimed that he was
denied from receiving a regular stipend from a social program of the
Government when he was unjustly removed from the list of beneficiaries.152 The Government argued that the claimant was removed because
he did not comply with the requirements of the list, so he was not entitled to the benefit anymore.153 As stated above, the Court ruled that, in
attendance to the particular circumstances of the claimant and the relevance of the rights involved, the Government had the burden to prove
that the claimant did not satisfy the requirements of the social benefit.154
Argentina has also incorporated this rule in a statutory level (in
both state and federal law) and has been developing this doctrine at a
jurisprudential level as well.155 In addition to medical malpractice, it has
been adopted in consumer right’s cases, insurance, billing disputes, la148. Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.J.S.] [Supreme Court], Sala. marzo 11, 1977, M.P, Sentencia, Gaceta Juridica [G.J.] (No. 2398, p. 332) (Colom.).
149. C.S.J., supra note 148, at 22.
150. See generally Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], enero 16, 2009, Sentencia T-006/09, Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional [G.C.C.] (Colom.), available at
http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2009/T-006-09.htm.
151. Id. at 13 (The author has translated part of this sentence for purposes of this article, and
similar decisions of the Constitutional Court of Colombia can be found in the sentences T-1095,
2008 and T-719, 2008).
152. Id. at 2-3.
153. Id. at 3.
154. Id. at 6.
155. CÓDIGO PROCESAL CIVIL Y COMMERCIAL DE LA PROVINCIA DE LA PAMPA [CÓD. PROC.
CIV. Y COM. LP] [CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL CODE OF THE PROVINCE LA PAMPA] (B.O. 1828)
(Arg.).
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bor law and bankruptcy. The leading cases are Acosta156 in 1993 and
Pinheiro157 in 1997.
At the statute level, the Civil Procedural Code of La Pampa, Article 360 paragraph 4 states that, without prejudice to the main rule of
burden of proof, it has the burden to prove the facts the party that, attending to the particular circumstances of the case, is, in terms of the
tribunal, in better condition to arrive to the clarification of the facts.158
The civil procedural codes of the provinces of Corrientes,159 San Juan160
and Santiago del Estero161 have incorporated similar provisions.
Article 189 of the General Procedural Code of Uruguay mandates
the maximum cooperation of the parties when incorporating the evidence to the process.162 Article 189.3 states that if the required party denies to collaborate with the evidence after a judicial order, that negative
shall be interpreted as a confirmation of the exactitude of the allegations
over the facts that is sought to prove by the other party, unless there is
evidence in the contrary.163
The Spanish Civil Procedure Act of 2001 adopted in its Article
217 this doctrine by stating different cases where the Defendant has the
burden of proof (e.g. in case of unfair competition practices) and by
stating that the tribunal, when allocating the burden of proof between
the parties, “shall consider the availability and feasibility of the evidence of the parties to the dispute.”164
The Article 17.3 of the UNIDROIT Principles of Transnational
Civil Procedure, states that “[a]mong the sanctions [for failure or refusal
to comply with obligations concerning the proceeding] that may be appropriate against parties are: drawing adverse inferences; (. . .); rendering default judgment; (. . .) and awarding costs in addition to those
156. Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Provincia de Buenos Aires [SCJ BAs] [Supreme Court
of Justice of the Province of Buenos Aires], 4/8/1992, “Acosta, Ramón Teófilo y otro v. Clínica
Indarte S.A. y otro / recurso extraordinario inaplicabilidad de la ley”, Jurisprudencia Argentina [J.
A.] (1993-IV-66) (Arg.).
157. Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN] [National Supreme Court of Justice],
10/12/1197, “Recurso de hecho deducido por la actora en la causa Pinheiro, Ana María y otro c/
Instituto de Servicios Sociales para el Personal Ferroviario” La Ley [L.L.] (Arg.).
158. CÓD. PROC. CIV. Y. COM. LP art. 360 (Arg.).
159. Id. art. 60.
160. CÓD. CIV. DE LA PROVINCIA DE SAN JUAN, art. 380 (Arg.).
161. CÓDIGO PROCESAL CIVIL Y COMMERCIAL [CÓD. PROC. CIV. Y COM.] [CIVIL AND
COMMERCIAL CODE] art. 382 (B.D. 6910) (Arg.).
162. CÓD. GEN. DEL PROCESSO [General Procedural Code], LEY NO 15.982, art. 189.1 (1997)
(Uru.).
163. Id. art. 189.3.
164. LEY DE ENJUICIAMIENTO CIVIL (L.E. CIV.) (CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE) art. 217.7
(Spain).
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permitted under ordinary cost rules.”165 Also, Article 16.2 of the same
corpus contains an interesting declaration that is applicable to the doctrine in analysis: “[i]t is not a basis of objection to such disclosure that
the evidence may be adverse to the party or person making the disclosure.”166
The Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council, regarding the “procedures and remedies necessary to ensure
the enforcement of intellectual property rights,”167 states that when there
is required and specified certain evidence in control of the other party,
“the competent judicial authorities may order that such evidence be presented by the opposing party, subject to the protection of confidential
information.”168
In Germany this doctrine has been applied on a case-by-case basis
more than from a common objective rule. For instance, it has been applied mainly in cases of medical malpractice with grave wrongdoing by
the faculty, in some consumers’ rights issues, in labor law disputes, in
banking contracts and in some environmental issues.169
In Italy, we find a specific statute provision that allows the judge
to deduce proof arguments from the parties’ behavior during the process. Article 116 of the Italian Civil Procedural Code states that “the
judge can imply arguments of evidence from the answers given by the
parties, (. . .) from their unjustified refuse to consent inspections ordered
by the judge and, in general, from the parties behavior showed in the
context of the process.”170
In England we find the “pre-action protocols” that are required in
certain types of actions. Those procedures have the purpose of facilitating the exchange of information and help to “allow [the parties] to understand each other’s position and make informed decisions about settlement and how to proceed.”171 Regarding the sanctions for noncompliance, “[t]he court will look at the overall effect of noncompliance on the other party when deciding whether to impose sanctions,”172 which include the stay of proceedings and the payment of the

165. American Law Institute, UNIDROIT Principles of Transnational Civil Procedure, 20044 UNIF. L. REV. 758, 790 (2004).
166. Id. at 788.
167. Council Directive 2004/48/CE., art. 1, 2004 O.J. (L 195) 16, 19.
168. Id. art. 6.1, 2004 O.J. (L 195) 16.
169. Los Angeles Gonzalez, supra note 142, at 375.
170. CODICE DI PROCEDURA CIVILE [C.p.c.][CIVIL PROCEDURAL CODE] art. 116 (It.).
171. Practice direction, pre action motion § 6.1(1), Ministry of Justice available at
http://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/civil/rules/pd_pre-action_conduct#1.1
172. Id. § 4.5.
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associated costs.173
IV. THE DYNAMIC ALLOCATION OF BURDENS DOCTRINE AND THE US
PLEADING STANDARD
At this final stage, I try to propose a rule in order to raise in a practical way some of the issues that have to be considered when analyzing
the incorporation of this doctrine into the judicial system.
Therefore, for purposes of this analysis, let us assume that the following two modifications to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(FRCP) have been adopted:
First, adding the following new letter (g) to the Rule 37 “Failure to
Make Disclosures or to Cooperate in Discovery; Sanctions” of the
FRCP Chapter V:
“(g) Dynamic Allocation of the Burden of Proof
In cases of manifest disproportionality between the parties’ access to the core evidence of the case, the court may allocate the
burden of proof to the uncooperative or powerful party in accordance with the availability or feasibility of the same. The
court shall notify the parties of its decision to allocate the burden of proof in light of the consequences that the court decision may have on the parties’ obligation to present evidence.”
Second, stating as a new ground to deny a motion to dismiss: the
fact that the plaintiff is comprehended in the situation of the new Rule
37(g). For instance, by adding as a new last paragraph of Rule 12(b)174
of the FRCP the following:
“A motion asserted under any ground of this Rule may be denied if
the plaintiff is in the condition stated in [new] Rule 37(g).”
A. Positive effects
With this new set of rules, the court does not need to change its
general plausibility standard when deciding a motion to dismiss. In cases where the plaintiff that is facing a motion to dismiss argues the situation of the new Rule 37(g), the court does not have to say if the claim is
or is not plausible. It just has to deny a motion to dismiss on grounds of
the new paragraph of the Rule 12(b) if it believes that the conditions of
Rule 37(g) are applicable to the plaintiff.
Therefore, these modifications do not change the current pleading
standard as a general rule, but preempt the early dismissal of cases
173. Id. § 6.1.
174. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b).
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where the manifest asymmetry between the parties makes one party
control the core evidence of the case. As stated by Professor Kassem,
the issue here is not to evaluate the plausibility requirement of the complaint as “a factor of existential consequence.”175
Furthermore, these proposals encourage the good performance of
the parties regarding their discovery and disclosure duties. The party
that has an advantage against the other party and controls the main evidence of the case will know in advance that if he or she does not cooperate, the court may apply this doctrine as stated in the new Rule 37(g).
That previous knowledge would encourage full commitment of the parties with the process and is a good incentive to strengthen the good faith
litigation principle.
Besides, we have to consider that this tool necessarily raises evidence that will help the jury in their fact-finding task. As stated by Morello, the efforts of the jurists [i.e. lawmakers] do not have to be centered in the allocation of the burden to prove, but in the court’s due
diligence task to find the facts, without considering what the parties are
or are not doing.176 Consequently, as the outcomes of the judicial system
are going to be more accurate to the reality, the judicial error in the
judgments is going to decrease, which will bring all the advantages that
that means for the society.
Also, this rule contains an important improvement in terms of the
way in which the Government assures the access to justice to the people
regardless of their social or economic conditions and their power relationship. It is a court’s tool designed to guarantee access to certain types
of cases to receive a grounded pronouncement over the merits by a
court. It reduces the cases that are won or lost because of procedural
tricks and not on their merits.
Finally, given that it represents an important tool that has to be
used only in certain cases, it is the judge who has to decide (not a plain
rule) whether a certain case fulfills the requisites of “manifest disproportionality” regarding the proof availability, and then whether to apply
or not this doctrine in such a case. The court is not mandated to use this
institution; it is just a procedural mechanism that can be used.177 This
175. Kassem, supra note 24, at 1446.
176. AUGUSTO MORELLO, LA PRUEBA. TENDENCIAS MODERNAS. HACIA una VISION
SOLIDARIA de la CARGA de LA PRUEBA [The Proof, Modern Tendencies. Towards a Solidary Approach of the Burden of Proof] 55 (Abeldo Perrot ed., 1911); see also Los Angeles Gonzalez, supra note 142, at 372.
177. For the NCPC, and for almost all of the judicial systems abroad that have incorporated
this doctrine, it is also considered as a power that the judge is not mandated to use, even if he esteems that the requisites are fulfilled.
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feature is positive because it implements this tool in terms that do not
promote frivolous or meritless litigation and promotes the possibility of
being heard to grounded cases where it is impossible for the plaintiff to
succeed in a motion to dismiss under the plausibility criterion. Also, by
implementing this doctrine as optional, the exceptional nature of this judicial tool is reaffirmed.
B. Due Process and Dynamic Allocation of Burdens Doctrine
Although a constitutional analysis of this doctrine is both necessary and interesting, it is far beyond the scope of this paper. However, I
would like to raise a few constitutional issues that one has to take into
account when analyzing this doctrine from a due process perspective.
There are at least four aspects of the Due Process principle that are
closely connected to the doctrine in analysis. First, the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment is understood as a limitation on arbitrary authority and a guarantee against all unreasonable legislation,
“which demands that all laws shall not be unreasonable, capricious, or
arbitrary.”178 Second, as asserted by the U.S. Supreme Court, due process is not a technical conception with fixed content unrelated to time,
place and circumstances; rather, it “is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.”179 Third, the central meaning of “procedural due process” is that “[p]arties whose rights
are to be affected are entitled to be heard.”180 Finally, even though we
are analyzing this doctrine from a civil procedural perspective, it is important to take into account another comprehensive principle of the due
process standard: the non self-incrimination principle.181 Therefore, any
constitutional analysis has to consider, at least: whether the dynamic allocation of burdens doctrine implies an unreasonable delegation of
powers that judges can use arbitrarily; whether it affects the constitutional right to be heard; and whether it implies a violation to the non
self-incrimination principle.
Regarding the critique that the dynamic allocation of burdens doctrine may be against the adversarial system and that it may imply a nondesirable delegation of powers to the judge,182 one can provide two lines
178. Fela v. United States, Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 730 F. Supp. 779, 783 (N.D. Ohio 1989); see
also W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 399 (1937).
179. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976).
180. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
181. See Jonathan M. Rund, McKune v. Lile: Evisceration of the Right Against SelfIncrimination Through the Revival of Boyd v. United States, 12 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 409, 410
(2003).
182. B. no. 8197-07 §IV.6 (a)-(b), supra note 6, at 25.
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of arguments. First, the use of this power has to be requested by the party in those exceptional cases of manifest asymmetry between the parties
and where one of them has total control over the core evidence of the
case. Besides, it is always up to the judge to apply this doctrine: the
court can deny it with no further reason.183 As described above, it is not
conceived as a regular judge’s power to all cases, but only to some of
them where the requirements are met.184 Second, by analyzing this doctrine by contrast to the current plausibility standard, one can raise the
following questions. Is this a higher delegation of powers than the current one at the pleading phase? Is it not more “inquisitorial” to have
courts with the authority to set aside a claim if found “not plausible”
with no evidence, cross-examination nor any minimum debate?
Considering the constitutional right to be heard, I believe that this
institution does not affect that guarantee but instead promotes it. This
institution improves the opportunity to hear certain cases that under the
current pleading standard are unable to pass a motion to dismiss. Moreover, the current pleading standard casts serious doubts over the protection of the right to be heard. Along with stating the right to notice and
the opportunity to be heard, the Supreme Court has ruled that those requirements have to be applied in a “meaningful manner.”185 Does the
current plausibility pleading standard fulfill the opportunity to be heard
in a meaningful manner?
Additionally, the following argument addresses the assumption
that with the application of this doctrine the court is obligating a party to
prove against its own interests.186 Notwithstanding that the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled “that a violation of the constitutional right
against self-incrimination occurs only if one has been compelled to be a
witness against himself in a criminal case.”187 I believe that even if said
principle is applied to noncriminal cases, the doctrine in the analysis
does not affect it. First, the court is never going to require a party to
prove against himself, but instead to prove the correspondent’s negative
fact. Going back to the example of medical malpractice, the hospital
need not prove that medical malpractice was committed, but instead
must prove that it did not occur. Second, even though the borderline is
not always clear, it is important to distinguish between the imposition to
a party of the obligation to prove certain facts that affect its interests
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

Id. at 8197-07 §IV.4, §V.2(a), at 22.
Id. at 8197-07 §IV.1, §IV.4, §V.2(b), at 22, 35.
Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 80 (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)).
Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 775 (2003).
Id. at 770.
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and the imposition of the obligation to present evidence that may affect its interests. The first case clearly affects the Due Process rule, but
the second evidently does not.
Finally, I would like to briefly mention the recent U.S. Supreme
Court decision in Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski LLC (2014), where the
main issue in dispute, from a procedural perspective, was the allocation
of the burden of proof.188 It is a patent law case where the Court reaffirmed its long held case law that “the burden of proving infringement
generally rests upon the patentee.”189 However, for purposes of this article, the way it was decided is interesting.
Medtronic (licensee) and Mirowski (patentee) had a licensing
agreement where the licensee agreed to pay a fee to practice certain
Mirowski patents.190 Later, the patentee notified the licensee of patent
infringement by Medtronic, who then challenged that assertion of infringement in a declaratory judgment action. The District Court recognized that Mirowski was the defendant in the action, but concluded that
Mirowski, as the party asserting the infringement, had the burden of
proving infringement.191 The Federal Circuit disagreed and then the Supreme Court reversed, upholding the District Court’s decision on this
issue.192
These recent and thought-provoking decisions should be analyzed
in-depth in an exclusive paper. The Supreme Court ruled that the party
(licensee) that alleged there was no infringement by seeking a declaratory judgment did not have the burden to prove the detailed facts that sustained its case (i.e. that he or she has not breached the license agreement), but the party against whom the action is served (patentee)
regarding the existence of the infringement had the burden.193 Did the
Court’s decision affect the defendant’s due process guarantees by requiring him to bear the burden of proof? I believe it did not, because the
core evidence of the case required to properly decide whether there is
infringement, is on the defendant’s (patentee’s) side: where the evidence is more available and feasible. In the same way, neither does the
dynamic allocation of burdens doctrine.

188. Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski Family Ventures, LLC, 134 S.Ct. 843, 844 (2014).
189. Id. at, 849.
190. Id. at 846.
191. Id. at 847.
192. In Medtronic Inc. v. Bos. Sci. Corp., 695 F.3d 1266, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2012), the Court of
Appeals held that considering the particular circumstances of this case, a party “seeking a declaratory judgment of non-infringement,” namely Medtronic, “bears the burden of persuasion.”
193. Id. at 1274.
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V. CONCLUSION
In Twombly and then in Iqbal, the Supreme Court of the Unites
States changed the pleading standard, introducing the plausibility criteria. Above, I have briefly argued and analyzed the undesirable effects of
that shift. Then I discussed in a comparative way the Chilean Procedural
Reform and its decisions concerning the pleading standard, including an
analysis of the dynamic allocation of burden doctrine. Finally, I have
drafted an amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that incorporates that doctrine, to then briefly analyze its effects and highlight
its positive and negative concerns.
In the process of designing a procedural judicial system, all the effects and counter effects of every decision have to be balanced and put
under permanent scrutiny. In the current scenario post Twombly and Iqbal, it seems to be very difficult for certain plaintiffs who claim justice
with meritorious cases, to pass a motion to dismiss. That fact is a critical
issue to every system of justice that seriously intends to grant fairness to
its people.
In this context, the dynamic allocation of burdens doctrine is an institution that has to be considered, especially by those who think that the
undesirable effects of Twombly and then of Iqbal need to be taken into
account. As analyzed above, this judicial tool does not require changing
the new plausibility rule; it only preempts the early dismissal of cases
where the manifest asymmetry between the parties makes one party
control the core evidence of the case; encourages good performance by
the parties regarding their discovery and disclosure duties; and necessarily raises evidence that will help the court (or jury) in its fact-finding
task, reducing judicial error.
The purpose of this paper is to bring attention to the current procedural injustice of the first phase of the U.S. civil procedure, and to briefly analyze an interesting antidote that, as noted above in section II, has
been implemented in other latitudes. There are no absolute procedural
rules to address the procedural inequalities that may affect the parties,
and no absolute procedural rules to address every alternative that
strengthens the compromise of the judicial system in granting justice to
everyone who requires it. However, it has to be seriously taken into account.

